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ARTICLE
WHAT HAPPENS ON MYSPACE STAYS ON MYSPACE:
AUTHENTICATION AND GRIFFIN V. STATE
By: Mark C. Kopec
This Article discusses authentication of social media evidence and
focuses on the recent Court of Appeals of Maryland decision in Griffin v.
State. l Griffin was a split-decision in a case of first impression in
Maryland. 2 The majority held that certain social media requires a greater
degree of authentication than non-electronic evidence because of "the
potential for abuse and manipulation of a social networking site by
someone other than its purported creator and/or user.,,3 The court
described three "authentication opportunities" and stated that possible
avenues "will, in all probability, continue to develop as the efforts to
evidentially utilize information from the [social media] sites increases.,,4
These authentication opportunities are explored below, and Griffin's
application to other factual scenarios is discussed.
1.

MYSPACE

Griffin involved an account on Myspace, a social networking website. 5
In order to create a free account on myspace.com, 6 a user must fill in
information for first and last name, provide an email address, choose a
password, enter a birth date, and indicate gender. 7 The user is then given
an opportunity to upload a photo. 8 The site automatically sets your
location based on the location of the computer used to create the account,
but the information can be changed. 9 Additionally, a country and state

Griffin v. State, 419 Md. 343,19 A.3d 415 (2011).
See id. at 351, 19 A.3d at 420.
Id. at 357, 19 A.3d at 424.
4
Id. at 363, 19 A.3d at 427 (citing Katherine Minotti, Comment, The Advent of Digital
Diaries: Implications of Social Networking Web Sites for the Legal Profession, 60 S.c. L.
REv. 1057 (2009».
5
MYSPACE, http://www.myspace.comlHelp/AboutUs?pm_cmp=edJooter (last visited
Feb. 19,2012); see also United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 453 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (citing
testimony of a Myspace executive describing Myspace as "a social networking" website).
6
See MYSPACE, https:llwww.myspace.comlsignup (last visited Feb. 19,2012) (click on
the "Sign up free" hyperlink located on the right side of the webpage).
I

7

Id.

See Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 453-55 (detailing procedures to become a member through
testimony of a Myspace executive).
9
See MYSPACE, http://www.myspace.comlmy/settings/profilelbasicinfo (last visited
Mar. 2,2012).
8
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must be selected from drop down menus, but anything can be listed as the
town, real or fictional. 10
In fact, all of a user's identifying information can be fictional. The
fields for first and last name must be filled in, but the information entered
does not have to be accurate. Nicknames can be used. The fields will
accept anything, including gibberish. Anyone who possesses the
requested information about another person can create an account
purporting to be that person. II
Once an account is created, the user gets a page on the website. 12 The
user can then post different types of content on the page, including
statements, photos, and links to other websites. 13 A user can become
"friends" with other users.14 Those "friends" also can post items on the
user's page. IS Myspace has privacy settings that allow users to limit
access to their personal pages only to their "friends," while excluding the
general pUblic. 16 Users who are "friends" with one another can also send
private messages between themselves, which works just like email. 17
Myspace was founded in 2003. 18 Prior to the advent of social media,
the court in St. Clair v. Johnny's Oyster & Shrimp, Inc. provided an
often-cited early commentary on the "inherently untrustworthy" nature of
information on the Internet in the context of electronic evidence. 19 In St.
Clair, the plaintiff attempted to introduce a printout from the United
States Coast Guard online vessel database to prove the defendant's
ownership ofa boat. 20 The court rejected that evidence, stating:
Plaintiffs electronic "evidence" is totally insufficient to
withstand Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. While some look to
the Internet as an innovative vehicle for communication, the
Court continues to warily and wearily view it largely as one large
See id.
Griffin, 419 Md. at 352-53, 19 A.3d at 421 (citing Nathan Petrashek, Comment, The
Fourth Amendment and the Brave New World of Online Social Networking, 93 MARQ. L. REV.
1495, 1499-\500 (2009-2010) (evaluating whether social networking users maintain a
reasonable expectation of privacy in their online activity such that the police would require a
warrant to search that activity».
12
See MYSPACE, http://www.myspace.comJpages/privacysettings?pm_cmp=edJooter
(last visited Feb. 20, 2012).
13
ld.
14
ld.
15
ld.
16
ld.
17
MYSPACE, http://www.myspace.com/guide/im (last visited Mar. 2,2012).
18
John S. Wilson, Comment, Myspace, Your Space, or Our Space? New Frontiers in
Electronic Evidence, 86 OR. L. REV. 1201, 1222 (2007) (citing MYSPACE - WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.orglwikilMySpace(lastvisitedApr.l1, 2008».
19
St. Clair v. Johnny's Oyster & Shrimp, Inc., 76 F. Supp. 2d 773, 774 (S.D. Tex. 1999).
20 !d.
iO

II
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catalyst for rumor, innuendo, and misinformation. So as to not
mince words, the Court reiterates that this so-called Web provides
no way of verifying the authenticity of the alleged contentions
that Plaintiff wishes to rely upon in his Response to Defendant's
Motion. There is no way Plaintiff can overcome the presumption
that the information he discovered on the Internet is inherently
untrustworthy. Anyone can put anything on the Internet. No
web-site is monitored for accuracy and nothing contained therein
is under oath or even subject to independent verification absent
underlying documentation.
Moreover, the Court holds no
illusions that hackers can adulterate the content on any web-site
from any location at any time. For these reasons, any evidence
procured off the Internet is adequate for almost nothing, even
under the most liberal interpretation of the hearsay exception
rules found in FED.R.CIY.P. 807. 21
While our society's acceptance of, and reliance on, the Internet has
increased greatly since the 1999 St. Clair decision, similar concerns
continue with social media. One tragic example involving creation of a
fictional profile on MySpace occurred in Us. v. Drew. 22 There, the
defendant was the mother ofa 13-year-old gir1.23 The defendant created a
page on MySpace for a fictional 16-year-old boy, named him "Josh
Evans," and a posted a photograph of a boy without that boy's
knowledge. 24 The defendant used the fictional profile to contact one of
her daughter's female classmates and flirted with her over a number of
days.25 Then, the defendant had "Josh" inform the classmate that he was
moving away, and told the classmate that "the world would be a better
place without her in it."26 That same day, the classmate killed herself. 27
An anonymous identity can also conceal financial interests that are
behind information placed on the Internet. For example, the Chief
Executive Officer of Whole Foods Market created an identity called
"Rahodeb" and posted over 1,100 times to an online financial bulletin
board over a 7-year period, often championing his company's stock and
occasionally blasting his company's rival, Wild Oats Market. 28
ld. at 774-75 (emphasis in original).
Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 452.
23
ld. at 452.
24
ld.
25
Jd.
26 ld.
27 ld. The defendant's conviction under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.c. §
1030, was overturned based on a violation of the void-for-vagueness doctrine.ld. at 463-64.
28 Andrew Martin, Whole Foods Executive Used Alias, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 12, 2007,
available at http://www.nytimes.coml2007107I12/businesS/12foods.html?scp= 1&sq=whole%
20foods%20executive%20used%20alias&st=cse.
21

22
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As the use of email expanded, it became increasingly sought by parties
in litigation, in part because of the casual and candid manner in which
people use email. The same thing is happening with social media. Social
media sites like Myspace and Facebook have hundreds of millions of
users.29 A party's page may contain a statement or picture that is
inconsistent with a position taken by the party in litigation, or consistent
with an opponent's position. It can happen in every type of civil or
criminal case. The issues discussed in this article are arising in litigation
with ever-increasing frequency.
II.

GRIFFIN V. STATE

In April 2011, the Court of Appeals of Maryland decided Griffin v.
State,30 in which the defendant, Griffin, was on trial for a shooting
death. 31 During the trial, the prosecution sought to introduce pages
printed from what it contended was Griffin's girlfriend's Myspace page. 32
The purpose was to provide corroboration of the testimony of a
prosecution witness that, prior to trial, the witness was threatened by the
defendant's girlfriend, Jessica Barber. 33
Barber's Myspace profile was under the name "Sistasouljah.,,34 The
printed pages from the profile described her as a 23-year-old female from
Port Deposit with a birthday of 10/2/1983, and contained a photograph of
a male and female. 35 The printed pages also contained the following
statement: "FREE BOOZY!!!! JUST REMEMBER SNITCHES GET
STITCHES!! U KNOW WHO YOU ARE! !,,36
Ms. Barber was called as a witness at trial by the prosecution, but was
not questioned about the Myspace printed pages. 37
Instead, the
prosecution attempted to authenticate the printed pages through the
testimony of an investigating police officer. 38 After the defense objected,
29 See FACEBOOK, http://newsroom.tb.comlcontentldefault.aspx?NewsAreald=22 (last
visited Feb. 28, 2012) (noting that, on average, at the end of December 2011, Facebook had
845 million monthly active users and 483 million daily active users); see also Melissa Bell,
Facebook and MySpace jOint announcement: MySpace welcomes Facebook users, WASH.
POST BLOG (Nov. 18, 2010, 12:18 PM), http://voices.washingtonpost.comlblogpostl2010/1Ilfacebook_and_myspacejoint_ann.html (explaining that in 2007, MySpace was
the reigning social network startup with 180 million registered users, but that number shrunk
to 100 million in February 2010).
30
Griffin, 419 Md. at 343,19 A.3d at 415.
31
ld. at 348, 19 A.3d at 418.
32
ld.
33 ld. at 348-49,19 A.3d at 418-19.
34 ld. at 348,19 A.3dat418.
35 ld.
36 Griffin, 419 Md. at 348,19 A.3d at 418.
37 ld.
38 ld.
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the officer testified outside the presence of the jury that he believed the
Myspace page belonged to Ms. Barber because of the photograph of her
and the defendant on the front, the reference to the defendant, and her
birth date on the page. 39
The following exchange took place between the trial judge and the
prosecutor:
Court:

On its face, there is no way that you can conclude
that on its face this establishes anything in regard
to [the witness]. What it's being offered for, as I
understand it, is corroboration, consistency that
she's making a statement in a public forum,
"snitches get stitches." And I guess the argument
is going to be made that that's consistent with
what [the witness] said, that she threatened him.

[Prosecutor]:

That's correct.

Court:

It's weak. I mean, there's no question it's weak,
but that's what it is offered for. 4o

The trial judge permitted the testimony and the defense entered into a
stipulation, in lieu of the testimony, while maintaining an objection.41 A
jury ultimately convicted Griffin of second-degree murder and other
related charges. 42 The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland held that
the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in admitting the Myspace
pages into evidence. 43
The Court of Appeals discussed what is required to create a Myspace
page, and generally how the site works. The court noted concerns that
someone can create a fictitious account under someone else's name, or
can gain access to another's account by obtaining the user's login
information. 44 The court also discussed the Drew decision and observed,
"[t]hus, the relative ease in which anyone can create fictional personas or
gain unauthorized access to another user's profile, with deleterious
consequences, is the Drew lesson.'>45 The court stated, "[t]he potential for
fabricating or tampering with electronically stored information on a social

Jd. at 349,19 A.3d at 418-19.
Jd. at 349-50, 19 A.3d at 419.
41
Jd. at 350, 19 A.3d at 419.
42
Grif.fin, 419 Md. at 343, 19 A.3d at 415.
43
Jd. at 346, 19 A.3d at 417; Griffin v. State, 192 Md. App. 518, 546, 995 A.2d 791, 808
(2010) rev'd, 419 Md. 343,19 A.3d 415 (2011).
44
Grif.fin, 419 Md. at 351-54, 19 A.3d at 420-22.
45
Jd. at 354, 19 A.3d at 421-22.
39

40
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networking site, thus poses significant challenges from the standpoint of
authentication of printouts of the site, as in the present case.,,46
Authentication is governed by Maryland Rule 5_901. 47 Subsection (a)
provides:
General provision.
The requirement of authentication or
identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied
by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in
question is what its proponent claims. 48
Methods of authentication are illustrated in Rule 5-901(b).49 The Griffin
court stated that the applicable subsections were (b)(l) and (b)(4), which
provide:
(b) Illustrations. By way of illustration only, and not by way of
limitation, the following are examples of authentication or
identification conforming with the requirements of this Rule:
(1) Testimony of witness with knowledge. Testimony of a
witness with knowledge that the offered evidence is what it is
claimed to be.
(4) Circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial evidence, such as
appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, location, or
other distinctive characteristics, that the offered evidence is what
it is claimed to be. 50
The Court of Appeals looked to the widely cited discussion of
authentication of electronically stored evidence by Magistrate Judge Paul
W. Grimm in Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. CO.,51 in which he noted that
authenticating electronically stored information presents a myriad of
concerns because "technology changes so rapidly.,,52 Judge Grimm also
noted that the "complexity" or "novelty" of electronically stored
information, with its potential for manipulation, requires greater scrutiny
of the "foundational requirements" than paper records to bolster
reliability. 53

Id.
MD. R. 5-90 I. The federal counterpart is FED. R. EVID. 90 I.
48
Griffin, 419 Md. at 354, 19 A.3d at 422.
49
MD. R. 5-901(b).
50
Griffin, 419 Md. at 355, 19 A.3d at 422.
51
Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534 (D. Md. 2007).
52
Id. at 544.
53
Id. at 543-44 (quoting WEINSTEIN & BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE §
900.06[3] (2d. ed. 1997)).
46
47
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In its reversal, the Court of Appeals held that the Court of Special
Appeals had "failed to acknowledge the possibility or likelihood that
another user could have created the profile in issue or authored the
'snitches get stitches' posting.,,54 The Court of Appeals explained its
ruling:
We agree with Griffin that the trial judge abused his discretion in
admitting the MySpace evidence pursuant to Rule 5-90 1(b)(4),
because the picture of Ms. Barber, coupled with her birthdate and
location, were not sufficient "distinctive characteristics" on a
MySpace profile to authenticate its printout, given the prospect
that someone other than Ms. Barber could have not only created
the site, but also posted the "snitches get stitches" comment. The
potential for abuse and manipulation of a social networking site
by someone other than its purported creator and/or user leads to
our conclusion that a printout of an image from such a site
requires a greater degree of authentication than merely identifying
the date of birth of the creator and her visage in a photograph on
the site in order to reflect that Ms. Barber was its creator and the
author of the "snitches get stitches" language. 55

A. Rule 5-104(b)
The court declined to address authentication under Maryland Rule 5104(b), stating:
Federally, some of the uncertainty involving evidence printed
from social networking sites has been addressed by embracing the
notion of "conditional relevancy," pursuant to Federal Rule
104(b), which provides "[ w ]hen the relevancy of evidence
depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court shall
admit it upon, or subject to, the introduction of evidence
sufficient to support a finding of the fulfillment of the condition."
In this way, the trier of fact could weigh the reliability of the
MySpace evidence against the possibility that an imposter
generated the material in question. See Lorraine v. Markel
American Insurance, 241 F.R.D. 534, 539-40 (2007). Maryland
Rule 5-1 04(b) establishes a nearly identical protocol; we,
54
Griffin, 419 Md. at 357, 19 A.3d at 423 (quoting Griffin, 192 Md. App. At 543, 995
A.2d at 806).
55
Id. at 357-58, 19 A.3d at 423-24. The court recognized that other courts have
suggested that greater scrutiny is appropriate for authentication of electronically stored
information on social networking sites because of the heightened possibility for manipulation
by other than the true user or poster. Id. at 358, 19 A.3d at 424 (discussing Commonwealth v.
Williams, 926 N.E. 2d 1162 (Mass. 2010); People v. Lenihan, 911 N.Y.S.2d 588 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 2010); United States v. Jackson, 208 F.3d 633 (7th Cir. 2000)).
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however, have not been asked been asked in this case to address
the efficacy of the Rule 5-l04(b) protoco1. 56
Professor McLain wrote in her treatise on Maryland Evidence that
"Md. Rule 5-90l(a), consistent with prior Maryland case law, establishes
that the standard of proof is the same as is found in Md. Rule 5-1 04(b) for
facts on which the relevance of an item is conditioned.,,57 It therefore
appears that the Griffin analysis under Rule 5-90l(a) may also apply
under .5-104(b).
III. GRIFFIN DISSENT
Judge Harrell wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by Judge Murphy,
who is the author of another Maryland evidence treatise, Maryland
Evidence Handbook. 58 The dissent noted that Maryland Rule 5-901
derives from Federal Rule of Evidence 901, and that federal cases
construing the federal rule are "almost direct authority impacting
construction ... of an [analogous Maryland Rule]. ,,59 The dissent relied
on federal cases in which courts held that "a document is properly
authenticated if a reasonable juror could find in favor of its
authenticity.,,6o The dissent noted that, although the Court of Appeals had
not previously enunciated such a standard, it is consistent with Maryland
Rule 5-901 's requirement of "evidence sufficient to support a finding that
the matter in question is what its proponent claims.,,61 The dissent stated:
Applying that standard to the present case, a reasonable juror
could conclude, based on the presence of the MySpace profile of
(1) a person appearing to [the investigating officer] to be Ms.
Barber posing with the defendant, her boyfriend; (2) a birthdate
matching Ms. Barber's; (3) a description of the purported creator
of the MySpace profile as being a twenty-three year old from Port
Deposit; and (4) references to freeing "Boozy" (a nickname for
the defendant), that the redacted printed pages of the MySpace
profile contained information posted by Ms. Barber. 62
The dissent acknowledged the concern that someone other than Ms.
Barber could have accessed or created the account, and have posted the
Griffin, 419 Md. at 365 n.15, 19 A.3d at 428 n.15.
ld. at 367 n.2, 19 A.3d at 429 n.2 (Harrell, J., dissenting) (quoting LYNN McLAIN,
MARYLAND EVIDENCE § 901: 1 (2001)).
56
57

JOSEPH F. MURPHY, JR., MARYLAND EVIDENCE HANDBOOK (4th ed. 1999).
Griffin, 419 Md. at 365-66, 19 A.3d at 428-29 (Harrell, J., dissenting).
60
ld. at 366, 19 A.3d at 429 (Harrell, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original) (internal
citations omitted).
61
ld. (emphasis in original).
62
ld. at 367, 19 A.3d at 429 (Harrell, J., dissenting).
58
59
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threatening message, but stated that the record suggested no motive to do
SO.63 The dissent felt that such concerns went not to the admissibility of
the Myspace page printouts under Rule 5-901, but rather to the weight to
be given by the trier of fact. 64 The dissent added:
It has been said that the "purpose of authentication is to ... filter
untrustworthy evidence." Like many filters that are unable to
remove completely all impurities, Rule 5-901 does not act to
disallow any and all evidence that may have impurities (i.e., in
this case evidence that could have come, conceivably, from a
source other than the purported source). As long as a reasonable
juror could conclude that the proffered evidence is what its
proponent purports it to be, the evidence should be admitted. The
potentialities that are of concern to the Majority Opinion are fit
subjects for cross-examination or rebuttal testimony and go
properly to the weight the fact-finder may give the print-outs. 65
IV. MAJORITY V. DISSENT
One court has suggested that electronic evidence has the "same
uncertainties" concerning authenticity as traditional documents, which
can have forged signatures or be on a stolen letterhead, but it declined to
create unique rules for electronic evidence. 66 There is a strong argument,
however, that the opportunity and ease with which electronic evidence
can be fabricated has led to substantially more widespread abuse in
electronic media than with traditional documents. This includes digital
photographs, which can be altered much more easily than traditional
photographs developed from film.
These differing views are what divided the majority and dissent in
Griffin. The majority has placed a greater burden on the authentication of
printouts from social media sites than on traditional documents. In doing
so, the court ensures that juries will not receive unreliable evidence that
fails to meet this heightened standard.
Under the dissent's approach, the jury would receive the evidence
upon a minimal showing from which it could be concluded that the
evidence is authentic. An opponent of fabricated evidence would
essentially have the burden shifted to him to prove the fabrication.
Depending on the facts of an individual case, the opponent of the

63
64

Id. at 367, 19 A.3d at 429-30 (Harrell, J. dissenting).
Id. at 367, 19 A.3d at 430 (Harrell, J., dissenting) (citing Hays v. State, 40 Md. 633,

648 (1874)).
65
Griffin, 419 Md. at 368, 19 A.3d at 430 (Harrell, J., dissenting) (internal citations
omitted).
66
See In re F.P., 878 A.2d 91,95-96 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005).
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evidence may not have access to the same sources and evidence as the
proponent in order to make such a showing. Meanwhile, all of this plays
out in front of the jury in a potentially distracting sideshow. While this
may be the usual process under Rule 5-1 04(b) when the jury has to decide
admissibility, the area of social media evidence is likely to involve more
instances of fabricated evidence. The majority's requirement of a greater
degree of authentication for this type of evidence should reduce the
number of such sideshows.
The tradeoff is that, under the majority's analysis, otherwise relevant
and admissible social media evidence will be excluded if the heightened
burden of authentication is not met. The methods of authentication
discussed by the Griffin majority are discussed below. Some of the
methods can be costly and time consuming, and there will be situations
where parties do not have the resources to pursue them.

v.

GRIFFIN METHODS OF AUTHENTICATION

The Griffin court stated that:
[W]e should not be heard to suggest that printouts from social
networking sites should never be admitted. Possible avenues to
explore to properly authenticate a profile or posting printed from
a social networking site, will, in all probability, continue to
develop as the efforts to evidentially utilize information from the
sites increases. 67
The court added that a number of opportunities come to mind. 68 These
are discussed below in reverse order as they appear in the majority's
analysis.

A. Informationfrom Social Networking Site
The Griffin court stated that one method "may be to obtain
information directly from the social networking site that links the
establishment of the profile to the person who allegedly created it and
also links the posting sought to be introduced to the person who initiated
it.,,69 The court stated, "[t]his method was apparently successfully
employed to authenticate a Myspace site in People v. Clevenstine.,,7o In
Clevenstine, the court described the testimony from Myspace: "[A] legal
compliance officer for MySpace explained that the messages on the
computer disk had been exchanged by users of accounts created by

67

68
69

70

Griffin, 419 Md. at 363, 19A.3dat427.
Id.
Id. at 364, 19 A.3d at 428.
Id. (citing People Y. CleYenstine, 891 N.Y.S.2d 511 (N.Y. App. Diy. 2009)).
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defendant and the victims ... ,.?l The basis for this statement is not
provided in the Clevenstine opinion. It is possible that Myspace was able
to demonstrate that the defendant's account was accessed by a computer
using the Internet with the Internet Protocol ("IP") address that was
assigned to the defendant, but that is not known. The Clevenstine court
also relied on other evidence, as further discussed below.
There are hurdles, however, in obtaining information directly from the
social networking site. Myspace and Facebook are the largest sites, and
they are both located in California. Both sites can decline to voluntarily
provide information, and have done so. Without voluntary cooperation,
an out of state litigant must arrange for a California subpoena to be issued
and properly served. In addition, any attempt to quash the subpoena may
be heard by the California court that issued the subpoena.
Moreover, there may be a motion to quash the subpoena under the
Stored Communications Act ("SCA,,).72 In 2010, the U.S. District Court
for the Central District of California held in a case of first impression that
the SCA applies to social networking sites. 73 "The SCA prevents
'providers' of communication services from divulging private
communications.,,74 The court noted that the SCA was passed in 1986,
before the advent of the World Wide Web. 75 The court observed that the
"[SCA] is not built around clear principles that are intended to easily
accommodate future changes in technology.,,76 The court went through a
lengthy analysis before quashing the subpoenas, finding that private
messages and page postings that could only be viewed by "friends" were
protected from discovery under the SCA.77
The SCA also contains a complex scheme allowing for disclosure of
certain information in response to a subpoena issued by a governmental
entity in connection with a criminal investigation or case. 78 The SCA's
scheme does not apply in civil cases, and was not at issue in Crispin. It is
not clear whether the scheme was invoked to obtain the Myspace
representative's testimony in Clevenstine.
The Crispin decision will be an important precedent for issues
involving application of the SCA to social networking sites, particularly
when the dispute is heard in a California court that has jurisdiction over
Presently, this method of pursuing
Myspace and Facebook.

71
72

73
74
75
76

77

78

Clevenstine, 891 N.Y.S.2d at 514.
Stored Communications Act (SCA),18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2008).
Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965,971-72 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
ld.
ld. at 971 n.15.
Jd.
ld. at 991.
!d. at 974-75 (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2009».
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authentication is likely to be the least attractive one, especially in civil
litigation.

B. Computer Search
The second method "may be to search the computer of the person who
allegedly created the profile and posting and examine the computer's
internet history and hard drive to determine whether that computer was
used to originate the social networking profile and posting in question.,,79
The Griffin court noted that computer forensic firms could conduct such a
search. 8o One complicating factor for this option is the variety of ways in
which someone can create and use a social networking profile, like
Myspace. It can be created or used on a computer or a smart phone. In
addition, it can be created or used on devices owned by someone else,
including a computer at the public library. Moreover, the creation of the
profile might be done on one device, while the use occurs on another.
The Griffin court specified that the search would be to determine if the
person's computer was used to create the profile and posting. In a case
decided after Griffin, one court noted that someone other than the creator
could use the profile because people "frequently remain logged in to their
accounts while leaving their computers and cell phones unattended.,,81
Given the emphasis by the Griffin court on the computer, and not the
user, it appears that such an argument against authentication would fail in
Maryland.
The Griffin court discussed the Clevenstine case in connection with
the method of obtaining information directly from the social networking
site. Clevenstine is discussed in this section of this Article because one of
the facts not discussed in Griffin is that the defendant's wife in
Clevenstine testified that she saw the Myspace instant messages at issue
in the defendant's Myspace account while logged on to the computer they
shared. 82
In Clevenstine, the defendant was convicted of rape and other sexual
crimes involving two teenage girls. 83 The defendant's wife found the
saved instant message communications between the defendant and the
younger victim, revealing sexually explicit discussions and indicating that
the two had engaged in sexual intercourse. 84 The defendant contended

79
80

81

82
83

84

Griffin, 419 Md. at 363,19 A.3d at 427.
Id. at 363-64, 19 A.3d at 427-28.
State v. Eleck, 23 A.3d 818, 822 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011).
Clevenstine, 891 N.Y.S.2d at 513.
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that the instant messages were improperly admitted into evidence because
they had not been properly authenticated. 85 The court held:
Here, both victims testified that they had engaged in instant
messaging about sexual activities with defendant through the
social networking site MySpace, an investigator from the
computer crime unit of the State Police related that he had
retrieved such conversations from the hard drive of the computer
used by the victims, a legal compliance officer for MySpace
explained that the messages on the computer disk had been
exchanged by users of accounts created by defendant and the
victims, and defendant's wife recalled the sexually explicit
conversations she viewed in defendant's MySpace account while
on their computer. Such testimony provided ample authentication
for admission of this evidence. Although, as defendant suggested
at trial, it was possible that someone else accessed his MySpace
account and sent messages under his usemame, County Court
properly concluded that, under the facts of this case, the
likelihood of such a scenario presented a factual issue for the
jury. 86
The wife's discovery of the messages on the computer she shared with
the defendant is what one court called a "confirming circumstance.,,87
That term is further explored below.
Once it appears that social media evidence is relevant to a case,
practitioners will want to evaluate the option of searching the computer
and smart phone devices that belong to the purported creator of the social
media evidence at issue. In addition to the issues discussed above, it
must be kept in mind that people can replace these devices on a frequent
basis, whether it is due to wear and tear, to upgrade, to get the newest
technology, or otherwise. Practitioners should keep in mind replacement
issues when deciding when to conduct such a search, as the delay could
be very costly.
C. Testimony by Creator
The Griffin court stated that the "first, and perhaps most obvious
method would be to ask the purported creator if she indeed created the
profile and also if she added the posting in question ... ,,88 This
corresponds under Rule 5-901(b)(1) to testimony of a witness with

85
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87
88

Id.at5l4.
!d. (internal citations omitted).
Commonwealth v. Purdy, 945 N.E.2d 372, 380 (Mass. 2011).
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knowledge that offered evidence is what it is claimed to be. 89 The court
stated that "a witness with knowledge. such as Ms. Barber, could be
asked whether the MySpace profile was hers and whether its contents
were authored by her; she, however, was not subject to such inquiry when
she was called by the State. ,,90
In addition to being the most obvious method, asking the purported
creator also is the method that can provide the most reliable evidence of
authentication. The question is whether the purported creator created the
evidence at issue. The best evidence is an admission by the creator under
subsection (b)( 1). By contrast, evaluation of circumstantial evidence
under subsection (b)( 4) can merely provide a picture from which it is
hoped that authentication can be determined. While each case of
circumstantial evidence will have to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis,
cases involving an admission by the creator should result in easy
authentication. Practitioners will therefore want to consider all of the
discovery tools available in pursuing an admission by the creator of social
media evidence. Methods will differ based on whether the purported
creator is a party or non-party, and whether the proceeding is a civil or
criminal one. Careful planning may be required to match available
discovery tools with each of the steps in the process: discovering the
existence of social media evidence; determining whether it is relevant;
obtaining the actual social media evidence; and developing the evidence
of authentication.

VI.

APPLICATION OF GRIFFIN To

OTHER SOCIAL MEDIA SCENARIOS

The Griffin case involved a posting on a Myspace profile. However,
the decision will be looked to for guidance in cases involving other social
media scenarios under the Rule 5-901 (b)(4) circumstantial evidence
standard, such as private messages between two users. The Griffin
court's discussion of two particular cases may be useful: One involved
private Myspace messages that work like email; the other involved instant
messages on an unspecified system.
The Griffin court discussed Commonwealth v. Williams 91 as an
instance in which a court "suggested greater scrutiny [of social media]
because of the heightened possibility for manipulation by other than the
true user or poster.,,92 In Williams, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts held that Myspace computer messages were not properly
authenticated. 93 A prosecution witness testified that she was with the
89
90
91
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Id.
ld. at 355 n.ll, 19 A.3dat422 n.ll.
Commonwealth v. Williams, 926 N.E.2d 1162 (Mass. 2010).
Griffin, 419 Md. at 358,19 A.3d at 424.
Williams, 926 N.E.2d at 1172.
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defendant on the night of the murder, heard him speak on the phone with
the victim, saw him display a gun before leaving, and then saw him return
with a lot of money. 94 At trial, the witness testified that she received
messages on MySpace from the defendant's brother urging her not to
testify against the defendant, or to claim a lack of memory about the
events. 95 The witness printed out the messages. 96 The printout showed a
picture of the defendant's brother on the MySpace page, and that the
username was "Doit4it," but the messages did not identify the sender by
his or her given name. 97
The witness responded to three of the messages received from the
defendant's brother, and said that the defendant's brother sent messages
back to her. 98 She did not respond to a fourth message. 99 The Griffin
court did not discuss these facts, and the Williams opinion did not provide
the details of the messages or responses. 100 The Williams court held that
there was insufficient evidence to authenticate the Myspace messages:
The contents of the messages demonstrate that the sender was
familiar with [the witness] and the pending criminal cases against
the defendant and desired to keep her from testifying.
There was insufficient evidence to authenticate the messages and
they should not have been admitted. Although it appears that the
sender of the messages was using [defendant's brother's]
MySpace Web "page," there is no testimony (from [the witness]
or another) regarding how secure such a Web page is, who can
access a MySpace Web page, whether codes are needed for such
access, etc .... Here, while the foundational testimony established
that the messages were sent by someone with access to
[defendant's brother's] MySpace Web page, it did not identify the
person who actually sent the communication. Nor was there
expert testimony that no one other than Williams could
communicate from that Web page. Testimony regarding the
contents of the messages should not have been admitted. 101
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Id.
Id.
Id.
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Williams, 926 N.E.2d at 1172.
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See Griffin, 419 Md. at 358-60, 19 A.3d at 424-25; see also Williams, 926 N.E.2d at
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The other notable case is In re F.p.102 The Griffin court distinguished
the case because it involved instant messages between two persons, rather
than po stings on social media that could be viewed by anyone. 103 In re
F.P. analyzed instant messages sent using an unidentified system. 104 The
proceeding was an appeal from adjudication on aggravated assault by a
delinquent. 105 The defendant argued that the trial court inappropriately
admitted transcripts of instant messages between him and the victim,
which occurred prior to the assault, and that the instant messages were
not properly authenticated. 106
The instant messages were between a user with the screen name
"Icp4Life30" and "WHITEBOY Z 404.,,107 The victim testified that his
screen name was "WHITE BOY Z," that he printed the instant messages
off of his computer, and that he believed that the other participant in the
conversation was the defendant. los Defendant believed that the victim had
stolen a DVD from him, and allegedly sent the victim messages saying he
wanted to fight. 109 The court described the instant messages as follows:

It appears that there are transcripts of several instant message
"conversations" between [victim] and [defendant] on at least two
different dates. In the first conversation, apparently taking place
July 30, 2003 and initiated by [defendant], [victim] asks "who is
this," and [defendant] replies, using his first name as it appears in
the record. Throughout the transcripts, [defendant] threatens
[victim] with physical violence and accuses [victim] of stealing
from him. [Victim] states, "i got no reason to fight u and u got no
reason to fight me[";] [defendant] answers, "ya i do. u stole off
me." Later, [defendant] taunts [victim] and tells him to come
over to his house; when [victim] states, "well i won't [sic] be there
cuz [sic] i not fightin u[";] [defendant] replies, ''well i am fightin
u so when i see u ur [sic] dead.,,11O
After receiving these instant messages, the victim notified his school
counselor and social worker. III Defendant and the victim met with the
school officials separately regarding the messages and the alleged theft.112
\02
\03

,
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One fact not discussed in Griffin is that the defendant did not deny
sending the instant messages. 113 Subsequent to the school meeting, and
just before the assault, another instant message conversation occurred. I 14
Defendant allegedly stated "u gotta tell tha [sic] school shit n stuff like a
IiI [sic] bitch.,,115 He also threatened, "want my brother to beat ur ass on
tha [sic] steel center bus" and "want [sic] till i see u outta school ima [sic]
beat ur aSS [sic ].,,116
The court found that there existed sufficient evidence that the
defendant sent the instant messages. 117 The defendant referred to himself
by his first name, and he repeatedly accused the victim of stealing from
him, which mirrored testimony that the defendant was angry about a
stolen DVD. The defendant also referenced the fact that the victim had
approached school authorities about the instant messages, and repeatedly
threatened the victim. The court stated, "[a]ll of this evidence, taken
together, was clearly sufficient to authenticate the instant message
transcripts as having originated from [defendant].,,1l8 The court also
stated:
Essentially, [defendant] would have us create a whole new body
of law just to deal with e-mails or instant messages. The
argument is that e-mails or text messages are inherently unreliable
because of their relative anonymity and the fact that while an
electronic message can be traced to a particular computer, it can
rarely be connected to a specific author with any certainty.
Unless the purported author is actually witnessed sending the email, there is always the possibility it is not from whom it claims.
As [defendant] correctly points out, anybody with the right
password can gain access to another's e-mail account and send a
message ostensibly from that person. However, the same
uncertainties exist with traditional written documents.
A
signature can be forged; a letter can be typed on another's
typewriter; distinct letterhead stationary can be copied or stolen.
We believe that e-mail messages and similar forms of electronic
communication can be properly authenticated within the existing
framework ofPa.R.E. 901 and Pennsylvania case law .... We see
no justification for construing unique rules for admissibility of
113
See generally Griffin v. State, 419 Md. 343 (2011). The In re F.P. court discussed the
fact that the defendant did not deny sending the instant messages, but the Court of Appeals of
Maryland did not discuss this fact in its analysis. In re F.P., 878 A.2d at 94.
114
In re F.P., 878 A.2d at 94-95.
115
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electronic communications such as instant messages; they are to
be evaluated on a case-by-case basis as any other document to
determine whether or not there has been an adequate foundational
showing of their relevance and authenticity. I 19
The Griffin court distinguished the case, stating:
In the Interest of F.P. is unpersuasive in the context of a social
networking site, because the authentication of instant messages by
the recipient who identifies his own "distinctive characteristics"
and his having received the messages, is distinguishable from the
authentication of a profile and posting printed from MySpace, by
one who is neither a creator nor user of the specific profile ... 120
We further note that authentication concerns attendant to e-mails,
instant messaging correspondence, and text messages differ
significantly from those involving a MySpace profile and posting
printout, because such correspondences is sent directly from one
party to an intended recipient or recipients, rather than published
for all to see. 121
It is not clear how the Griffin court would have addressed the
authentication of messages sent by social media. There are similarities
between In re F.P. and Williams, yet the Griffin court discussed them
differently. Both cases involved messages that were sent from one user
to another that appeared to be private, although In re F.P. did not specify
the system used for the instant messages. The content of the messages in
Williams is unknown. In In re F.P., the court provided significant details
that persuaded it to find sufficient evidence of authentication, including
defendant's failure to deny sending the instant messages during
communications with school officials. 122
Authentication of privates messages sent with social media under Rule
5-901(b)(4)'s circumstantial evidence standard will focus on the overall
picture to determine whether there exists sufficient evidence to conclude
that the messages are authentic. In addition to testimony of the recipient
of the messages, the content of the messages will be important to the
extent that they contain information and details likely only known by the
alleged sender. The overall picture will vary from case to case, and
courts will likely have to grapple with this issue on a case-by-case basis.
Also likely to be important are "confirming circumstances," which are
further discussed below.
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CONFIRMING CIRCUMSTANCES

When the Griffin court discussed testimony of a witness with
knowledge under Rule 5-901(b)(1), it noted that, in the case at hand, Ms.
Barber could have been asked whether the MySpace profile was hers, and
whether its contents were authored by her, but she was not asked those
questions. 123 The Griffin court then cited Us. v. BarlowJ24 and Us. v.
Gagliardi. 125 Both cases, however, did not involve a profile post; they
involved private messages. 126 In both cases, adult defendants were
convicted of crimes relating to attempts to have sex with minors. 127 Both
involved authentication of messages sent between the defendants and
infonnants working for law enforcement posing as minors. 128
In Barlow, the messages were exchanged on the Yahoo! Messenger
129
instant messaging service, and by email.
At the defendant's
instigation, the conversations were explicit, and the defendant emailed
multiple pornographic pictures of himself. 130
The court noted that the defendant did not contend that the message
log was altered. l3l The court then stated:
At trial, [infonnant] testified that the transcripts fairly and fully
reproduced the chats between her (posing as [a minor]) and
[defendant]. [Infonnant], as the other participant in the year-long
"relationship," had direct knowledge of the chats. Her testimony
could sufficiently authenticate the chat log presented at trial, and
it was not plainly erroneous to admit the transcript on this
basis.132
In Gagliardi, the instant messages were sent through an Internet chat
room called "I Love Older Men.,,133 The defendant expressed his desire
to have sex, and emailed a picture of himself to the purported underage
girl. 134 He also sent similar messages to an FBI agent who was posing as
another minor. 135 The court held that authentication was proper because
the informant and FBI agents both testified that "the exhibits were in fact
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accurate records" of the conversations with defendant. 136 The court found
that the informant and FBI agents were witnesses with knowledge under
Rule 5-901(b)(1).137
There is a good argument that the analysis in Barlow and Gagliardi
would not be appropriate under Griffin. There were no details in the
opinions about any distinctive characteristics in the messages. It can be
argued under the Williams decision, also cited in Griffin, that testimony
by the recipient of the messages alone in these cases is insufficient to
establish the identity of the actual sender of the messages. There were
other important facts, however, that the Barlow and Gagliardi courts did
not make part of their authentication analysis. They are what the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has called "confirming
circumstances.,,138 When these confirming circumstances are added into
the analysis, it appears that even a heightened degree of authentication
required by Griffin would be met.
In Barlow, the instant message communications at issue scheduled a
meeting for a particular time and place, and the defendant showed up as
planned. 139 That is certainly strong corroborative evidence that the
defendant was the one participating in the communications. Moreover,
when the defendant was arrested at the meeting place, his laptop was in
his car, and it had "remnants of the chats" with the informant. 140 It is
these two facts, or "confirming circumstances," that provide the strongest
evidence of authentication, yet they were not part ofthe court's analysis.
Similarly, in Gagliardi, the defendant was arrested at a meeting time
and place that had been arranged in the messages at issue. 141 The
defendant also admitted to police that "he was at the location to meet two
thirteen-year-old girls with whom he had previously had sexually explicit
online conversations.,,142 Those "confirming circumstances" were not
part of the court's authentication analysis.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts discussed "confirming
circumstances" in Commonwealth v. Purdy,143 which was decided 13
days before Griffin. In Purdy, the defendant was convicted of crimes
relating to running a house of prostitution. 144 On appeal, he claimed that
ld. at 15l.
ld.
138
See Purdy, 945 N.E.2d at 380 (Mass. 2011) (explaining that "confinning
circumstances" are those "that would allow a reasonable jury to conclude that [the] evidence
is what its proponent claims it to be.").
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ten email exchanges admitted into evidence had not been properly
authenticated. 145 The emails were taken from a computer located on the
premises at issue. 146 The defendant admitted that the computer was his
and that he used it. 147 He also provided from memory the passwords
necessary to access the computer. 148 The emails were sent from an email
address that had defendant's first and last names in it, and defendant
admitted he used the account. 149 The court described some of the emails
as follows:
Among the e-mail exchanges admitted in evidence was one that
was initiated from the defendant's e-mail address and signed with
the defendant's name and the address of the salon, and had the
"header," "personal assistant with benefits?" The author wrote
that he was "seeking a personal secretary with an open mind, who
... knows where to keep her nose and where not." In response to
a reply from a recipient, the author described himself as a
"working artist, as well [as an] entrepreneur, small business guy,
hairstylist, art and antiques dealer, [and] massage therapist," and
added "and I operate a service." In a later e-mail in this
exchange, also from the defendant's e-mail address, the author
asserted that potential earnings could range from $200 to $2,000
per week.
A separate e-mail was entitled "massage" and was sent from the
defendant's e-mail address and signed with the defendant's first
name. The author describes a "blond girl" who is "fairly new
and so a little nervous," and states: "If you are gentle and kind to
her I'm sure you're going to have a very good time." He adds,
"She has beautiful breasts and she will allow light touching. It is
ok, but no other touching." The recipient of the e-mail responded
that he wanted an "unhurried session" with a "gal who will treat
me right[,] be slow [,] gentle and very friendly within her limits."
An e-mail from the defendant's e-mail address and signed with
defendant's first initial replied, "I will make sure you are treated
well.,,150
The defendant denied authoring the emails, and moved in limine to
preclude their admission into evidence. 151 He stated that the computer
145
146
147
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was always on, and that the masseuses knew his passwords and used the
computer frequently. 152 He testified that they used his email account to
play pranks on him and to answer emails in his name. 153 The court
observed that the prosecution "did not furnish direct evidence that the
defendant had authored any of the ten e-mails admitted in evidence; there
was no testimony that anyone observed him typing any of the e-mails or
that anyone had discussed any of the e-mails with him.,,154
The court stated, "[w]hile e-mails and other forms of electronic
communication present their own opportunities for false claims of
authorship, the basic principles of authentication are the same.,,155 The
court added that a "judge making a detennination concerning the
authenticity of a communication sought to be introduced in evidence may
look to 'confirming circumstances' that would allow a reasonable jury to
conclude that this evidence is what its proponent claims it to be.,,156 The
court concluded:
Here there were adequate "confirming circumstances" to meet
this threshold: in addition to the e-mails having originated from
an account bearing the defendant's name and acknowledged to be
used by the defendant, the e-mails were found on the hard drive
of the computer that the defendant acknowledged he owned, and
to which he supplied all necessary passwords. While this was
sufficient to authenticate the e-mails in the absence of persuasive
evidence of fraud, tampering, or "hacking," there was additional
evidence of the defendant's authorship of most of the emails.At
least one e-mail contained an attached photograph of the
defendant, and in another, the author described the unusual set of
services provided by the salon when he characterized himself,
among other things, as a "hairstylist, art and antiques dealer, [and]
massage therapist." The defendant's uncorroborated testimony
that others used his computer regularly and that he did not author
the e-mails was relevant to the weight, not the admissibility, of
these messages. 157
The court distinguished its opinion in Williams, noting that the sender
of the messages in that case did not identify himself with the name of the
defendant's brother, or any other name. 158 The messages in Williams
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could have been sent from any computer, while the messages in Purdy
were sent from the defendant's password protected computer. 159
Although the Purdy court did not apply a heightened degree of
authentication for the emails, its use of "confirming circumstances"
should be applicable in Maryland cases. The Griffin court did not use
that term, but did discuss searching a computer as a method of
authentication, which could yield evidence that constitutes "confirming
circumstances.,,160 Moreover, there will be other evidence that will be
significant "confirming circumstances," even if it is not part of the
"distinctive characteristics" of the social media evidence itself under 5901(b) (4). Good examples are the defendants in Barlow and Gagliardi
showing up at meetings that were planned in the messages they allegedly
sent.
VIII. CONCLUSION

Under Griffin, a greater degree of authentication is required of certain
social media evidence. Practitioners will find that the best evidence of
authentication of social media evidence is an admission by the creator.
Cases without such an admission will have to be analyzed on a case-bycase basis, particularly the cases in which the proponent relies on
circumstantial evidence under Rule 5-90 1(b)(4).
Confirming
circumstances will be important in cases where the evidence itself does
not contain sufficient "distinctive characteristics" under 5-901 (b)(4) to
establish authentication.
The Griffin court noted that methods to authenticate social media
evidence might continue to develop. Developments could include
changes in technology or laws, such as revision to the SCA to bring it in
accord with updated technology. Advances in technology, however, have
at times raised more questions than they have answered. Such is the
current state of affairs with authentication of social media. Open
questions remain as the courts implement Griffin's guidance to other
factual scenarios.
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See Griffin, 419 Md. at 363-64, 19 A.3d at 427-28 (discussing possible avenues
available to properly authenticate printouts from social networking websites).
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